This paper investigates the interplay of trade and terrorism externalities under free trade between a developed nation that exports a manufactured good to and imports a primary product from a developing nation. A terrorist organization targets both nations and reduces its attacks in response to a nation's defensive counterterrorism efforts, while transferring some of its attacks abroad.
Introduction
Major trading countries like the United States (US) or trading blocs like the European Union (EU) are targets of terrorist organizations. Typically, these groups [e.g., al-Qaida, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)] locate in developing countries that lack the resources to stop them from operating. During the last two decades, this resource scarcity is often complemented by radical ideologies that can be more easily implanted among disaffected people at the margins of these societies, thereby supplying terrorist recruits Sandler, 2006, 2010) . As a consequence, terrorist hotbeds result in remote and difficult-to-govern areas in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere from which terrorist attacks are often planned. To protect against such attacks, targeted countries deploy defensive counterterrorism measures at home, which deflect attacks abroad.
1 In addition, terrorism disrupts the production of goods and services in an economy, while counterterrorism responses draw on productive resources. These production considerations affect global supply and demand of goods through general-equilibrium linkages, thus changing trade patterns and the international terms-of-trade. Despite these ubiquitous international terrorism and trade linkages, we are not aware of any article that provides a full-blown, general-equilibrium analysis of optimal counterterrorism policy in this context. This paper fills this gap and uncovers interesting asymmetries between developed and developing countries' counterterrorism strategies.
We consider a developed (e.g., United States) and a developing country (e.g., Pakistan)
with two goods -manufactured and primary. The developing country imports the manufactured good and exports the primary product. The developed country's export-import roles are just the reverse. 2 With its limited means, a terrorist organization targets both countries. Greater defensive counterterrorism by either country reduces terrorism at home, but raises it in the other country as the terrorist group redirects its attacks to the relatively softer target. 3 Such defensive measures may take the form of enhanced border security, greater surveillance, or hardening of potential targets.
Counterterrorism limits the production of the manufactured good through demand for closely related resources. Guns, surveillance cameras, helicopters, police vehicles, communication grids, and other manufactured goods are required for effective defensive counterterrorism efforts. Defensive measures also require labor in terms of guards and police, who must have the requisite equipment to protect potential targets and to coordinate defensive operations. When the developing country unilaterally raises its defensive actions, it likely augments the supply of the primary product by containing terrorism at home. Moreover, these larger defensive efforts take up resources used for the production of the manufactured good, thereby depleting its supply. These effects increase the supply of the primary product relative to the manufactured product in the global market and, in so doing, dampen the world price of the primary product. The developing country's defensive countermeasures have additional demand and supply effects due to terrorism deflection to the developed country. If the sum of these aforementioned effects is a net rise in the global excess supply of the primary product, its international market-clearing price falls, leading to a terms-of-trade loss for the developing country. In particular, consider the case of US-Pakistan trade and Pakistan's terms-of-trade since 1997. United States generally exported high-skilled, capital-intensive manufactured goods to below that of the small-country level, this country reduces its overprovision and potentially raises global welfare. By contrast, as the developed country raises its counterterrorism measure above the small-country level, it aggravates its overprovision and potentially reduces global welfare. The final welfare outcome hinges on how these opposing effects net out. The prognosis for global welfare is better if the developing country is more afflicted by terrorism, so that its Nash (small-country) overprovision is relatively greater than that of the developed country.
Next, consider the terms-of-trade externality in light of proactive counterterrorism, which curtails terrorists' prowess, thus making all countries more secure. Proactive measures rely on offensive weapons to confront terrorists directly using missiles, helicopters, drones, and other manufactured goods. In the absence of terms-of-trade effects, proactive measures are purely public among targeted countries, thereby resulting in underprovision (Sandler and Lapan, 1988; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006) . Proactive measures limit production and trade losses due to terrorism in both countries. 5 In this case, the terms-of-trade externality is qualitatively unchanged compared to defensive measures, with the developed (developing) country incentivized to increase (decrease) its proactive efforts relative to the small-country case.
However, the global welfare implications are now different as the developed country does more to address its underprovision, which can improve global welfare.
Finally, we return to defensive measures and consider a world where there are multiple exporters of the primary product, while there is one major importer like the United States. 6 If an exporter of a primary product reduces its defensive counterterrorism effort below the small- 5 There is an empirical literature that quantifies these terrorism-induced trade losses -see, e.g., Blomberg and Hess (2006) , Bandyopadhyay et al., (2018) , Egger and Gassebner (2015) , and Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) . Our paper is not empirical and is not about such losses. 6 Our analysis can be extended to the multi-importing country case, but we do not do so for two reasons. First, we want to focus on a major importing developed country like the United States that has market power, and on developing countries that may or may not have market power, given competing sources of supply. Second, our multi-country analysis reveals the economic forces at play, which can be easily applied to the multi-importing country case.
country level, it can only internalize a fraction of the terms-of-trade gain, while other primarygood exporting countries can free ride on this terms-of-trade gain. With such dissipation of gains, there is reduced incentive by each of the primary-good exporting countries to reduce their respective counterterrorism efforts below the small-country level. By contrast, the developed country, the monopoly importer, has the incentive to maintain a higher counterterrorism effort compared to the small-country level. Accordingly, the corresponding Nash counterterrorism equilibrium in this multi-primary-exporter case is likely characterized by overprovision.
Section 2 presents a two-country model of utility-maximizing counterterrorism policy, for which we describe and compare the noncooperative Nash equilibrium of the small-country case with that of the large-country case. Section 3 considers the global cooperative equilibrium of the large-country case, and analyzes the efficiency of the Nash small-and large-country cases.
Section 4 considers proactive counterterrorism policy that targets the strength of the common terrorist threat. Section 5 extends the basic model to a multi-country context wherein several developing countries export a primary product to a developed country. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
The baseline defensive counterterrorism model: Noncooperative Nash equilibrium
Consider a two-country world, where developed country A and developing country B are potential targets of terrorism from a terrorist organization. 7 Two goods, primary good (good 1) and manufactured good (good 2), are competitively produced in both countries. With free trade, country A imports the primary good and exports the manufactured good to country B, and the 7 The location of the terrorist organization is not critical to our model. The group could be located in either country or in a third country outside this two-country system. The central features are that each targeted country can deploy defensive measures to reduce its incidence and consequences of terrorism, and that the terrorist organization understands that greater defensive measures reduce the amount of terrorism in that targeted country. This then influences the terrorist organization's allocation of resources. atomistic firms that take output and factor prices as given. As such, the firms act nonstrategically. Accordingly, the terrorist organization and the firms move in stage 2. What is important is that the two governments choose their counterterrorism measure in stage 1 so that their choices are taken as given by the terrorist organization. The governments account for this dependence and choose their counterterrorism policies taking into account the effect on the terrorist organization's choices, the resulting terrorism levels, and the effect of these levels on the perfectly competitive market equilibrium in goods. For example, a government recognizes that its counterterrorism will limit terrorism, which, in turn, will raise factor endowments (e.g., through reduction of attacks on productive resources). The outward shift of production possibilities will change aggregate supply and demand (the latter through income effects). The market will clear at a new equilibrium price (terms-of-trade). The two governments' simultaneous-move counterterrorism choices endogenize all these different effects in the subsequent stage of the game. To ensure subgame perfectness, the game is solved by backward induction. Thus, we first describe the behavior of the terrorist organization in stage 2.
The terrorist organization (stage 2)
The terrorist organization's objective function consists of θ , in that country, but at a diminishing rate. Furthermore, we assume that a completely undefended target is hit with probability one. This success likelihood is independent of defensive measures used to harden targets abroad. Defensive counterterrorism, as modeled here, reduces the expected value of a successful attack by limiting the probability of an attack and its consequences. Overall, the modeling reflects that such defensive effort is nationally directed, so that it makes the defending country's targets on home soil less attractive from a terrorist organization's viewpoint. 8 The following formulations reflect these assumptions:
Based on eqs. (1)- (2), we can express the terrorist group's objective as:
8 This is then associated with negative terrorism spillovers to other countries as potential attacks are deflected abroad.
9 Changes in the terror production function, 
Suppressing the parameters α , β , and l from the functional forms and using subscripts to denote partials, we have that eq. (4) yields: 
Eq. (5) indicates that as A's counterterrorism increases, the terrorist group's marginal gains fall from allocating its resources to attacking A. Accordingly, the terrorist organization reduces its effort in hitting A, and shifts its resources to attacking B. Greater counterterrorism by B has the opposite effect. Given eqs. (2), (4), and (5), we can express the terrorism levels as: T θ θ θ < . (6) Eq. (6) shows that counterterrorism by either nation reduces terrorism at home but increases it abroad. We also assume that the magnitude of this own terrorism reduction ( ) j j T θ is subject to 10 We assume an interior optimum, which may rule out some functional forms or parameter combinations. An interior optimum is fairly standard and observationally equivalent to widely used models in which the value of marginal product is equalized between two activities/sectors (e.g., labor allocation between sectors in the specific factors model of trade 
We denote the expenditure function of country j (j = A,B) by ( ) j e ⋅ . By substituting eq. (6) into eq. (7), we have the expenditure-revenue identities of the two countries:
f x y z x y , then the following notation is used:
) . e p u r p T θ θ θ
Eqs. (8) and (9) (6) and (7) into eqs. (8) and (9), we get: We now turn to the determination of the equilibrium terms-of-trade. The free-trade price of the primary good is determined by the following international market-clearing condition for which the global demand for the primary good equals its supply (using Walras law, we know that at this equilibrium price, the international market for the manufactured good also clears) 14 , so
With σ as the slope of the world excess supply function of the primary good, international market stability dictates that 0 σ > . 15 Given this stability condition, eq. (11) implicitly defines
for which
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The terms in the numerator on the right-hand side of eq. (12a) can be used to unravel the different effects of conferring a terms-of-trade gain on country A. In an analogous fashion, one can explain eq.
(12b). As we discuss below, the terms-of-trade effects, captured by eqs. (12a) and (12b), play a critical role in respective defensive counterterrorism policy choices for the two countries.
By substituting eq. (12) into eqs. (10a) and (10b), we derive the following welfare, W,
Use of ( ) 
Similarly, the first-order condition and Nash best-response function for country B are:
Satisfaction of these best-response functions jointly determines the Nash defensive countermeasure equilibrium vector, ( )
To characterize the effect of international terms-of-trade externalities in this context, we first express the policy vector in the "small-country" case for which the relative price p is perceived by each country to be invariant to its respective defensive policy choices. Consider the following rules: X is large, and the global excess supply function of good 1 is relatively inelastic (i.e., σ is small). In contrast, the strategic effect (movement along the reaction curves) will be small when nation B's counterterrorism is inefficient in controlling terrorism (i.e., for the manufactured good to rise further, and induces A to pursue aggressively its defensive countermeasure beyond that justified in the small-country case, which constitutes a novel result.
In so doing, A's overprovision is exacerbated compared to the literature that ignores trade consequences of counterterrorism actions (e.g., Sandler and Lapan, 1988 obtain as long as the shifts dominate movements along the reaction curves.
Globally optimal counterterrorism policy
Until now, the discussion focuses on what is unilaterally optimal for the trading countries in light of a common terrorist threat; however, terms-of-trade and terrorism-deflecting externalities imply that the free-trade equilibrium is likely globally inefficient. After first defining a global optimum, we evaluate the Nash equilibrium of counterterrorism policy choices for the small-and large-country cases in regards to global efficiency.
Let G W represent the global welfare level as the sum of the utility levels of the two countries, so that
Differentiating eq. (16), we get:
For simplicity, we assume that the two countries' representative consumers possess identical and homothetic preferences. Insofar as preferences are preserved through monotonic transformations, we represent homothetic preferences by a homogeneous of degree one utility function; hence, the expenditure function can be expressed as:
In turn, this implies that ( ) 
because market clearing, eq. (11), implies that the net exports of the two countries must sum to zero. By substituting eq. (18) in eq. (17), we have:
We assume that
W θ θ is a strictly concave function of the counterterrorism vector.
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Hence, second-order conditions of a maximum are satisfied, and eq. (19) yields the first-order conditions of global welfare maximization as: The circular iso-welfare curve passing through S has lower welfare compared to * G , and any southwest movement from S is a movement to a higher iso-welfare curve. This follows because lower counterterrorism by either country alleviates terrorism-deflecting externalities. In other words, counterterrorism effort is overprovided by both countries at the small-country equilibrium compared to the global optimum.
[ Figure 1 near here]
This overprovision result is in keeping with the literature for the alternative case of an absence of trade, an active terrorist group, and two or more targeted countries (e.g., Rossi de Oliveira et al., 2018; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006) . However, this overprovision would be attenuated somewhat if the targeted countries have foreign interests that limit their deflection gains (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 2011) .
Corollary to Propositions 1 and 2:
Under the sufficient conditions for Propositions 1 and 2, A's defensive countermeasures are more overprovided at the Nash equilibrium compared to the outcome at the small-country case. 
Proactive counterterrorism measures targeting the terrorist group
Next, we turn to proactive counterterrorism measures (e.g., raids on terrorist assets, attacks on state sponsors, and group infiltration) that directly confront the terrorist group's operatives and operations (Enders and Sandler, 2012 
To foster clarity and avoid repetition, we focus on the global resource-reducing effect of proactive or offensive measures and, hence, amend eqs. (2)- (4) as follows:
Using 1 α β = = in eq.
(1) and applying eq. (22), we get:
The terrorist group's optimization problem is to maximize V by choosing (21) can be easily developed. However, for the sake of clarity, we restrict our attention to the novel aspect of this section, which is the global public good aspect of proactive policy.
Eq. (25) reflects the fact that, as proactive measures by any of the two countries reduce l , the terrorist group possesses fewer resources that can be allocated to terrorism in the two countries. Eqs (22) and (25) 
Eq. (26) shows that more proactive countermeasures by either country reduce terrorism in both countries, thereby yielding positive transnational external benefits.
The rest of the analysis is procedurally identical to that of Section 2 with the vector
θ θ . Accordingly, we have: (exporting) country of the primary good to raise (reduce) its counterterrorism effort relative to the small-country level. However, because counterterrorism is now associated with positive spillovers, one can safely surmise that the small-country counterterrorism effort is underprovided (see, e.g., Sandler and Lapan, 1988) . When, therefore, the developing country, which exports the primary good, reduces its proactive counterterrorism below the small-country level to improve its terms-of-trade, global welfare worsens. In contrast, as the primary-good-importing country raises its proactive effort, global welfare improves as long as the importing country does not overshoot its globally efficient counterterrorism level. If the developed country is the dominant supplier of proactive measures (the likely scenario), then global welfare is apt to increase as country A augments its proactive measures. Again, there is a novel asymmetry among the two trading countries owing to the terms-of-trade externality, so that corrective policy must account for the different incentives among trading partners in a proactive counterterrorism scenario.
Defensive countermeasures: Large importing country and many symmetric exporting countries of the primary good
Developing countries are typically not monopoly suppliers of a primary product to a large developed country, so that these primary good exporters' market power is more limited than previously presupposed. Thus, we now consider a situation where there is one large primary good importing country like the United States (denoted by A) and several primary good exporting countries like Pakistan and Indonesia (denoted by 1, 2,..., k n = ). As each country acts independently, the first-order condition of country j's choice of defensive counterterrorism and the associated Nash best-response function are as follows: 
The first of these two terms is positive because it represents the increase in primary good production in A as terrorism is reduced by A θ . By contrast, the second term is negative as terrorism is deflected to countries other than A, thereby reducing production of the primary good abroad. If these two effects largely offset each other, then the inequality is satisfied, and we have that . Given the assumed symmetry of primary good exporting countries, we have that
based on eq. (B13) of Appendix B, the following welfare implication holds:
Comparing eq. (29a) to eq. (29b), we see that the marginal effect for each primary good exporting country is smaller (approximately) by a factor of n , relative to the effect in country A.
Thus, we assert that
Eq. (29c) implies that the terms-of-trade motive for reducing defensive countermeasures by the primary good exporters is negligible when there are a large number of developing-country exporters. But, as we argue above, the developed country has the incentive to raise its effort level above the small-country level. If, therefore, the developing countries' effort levels are strategic complements (to the effort level of the developed countries), then they will react by raising their counterterrorism level. This Nash equilibrium will involve greater counterterrorism effort by all countries compared to the small-country case. Since the small-country equilibrium is characterized by overprovision (see Proposition 2) compared to the global optimum, the Nash equilibrium of this multi-country case will surely be associated with overprovision under strategic complementarity. However, the overprovision is somewhat moderated if developing countries' effort levels are strategic substitutes to the developed country's defensive measures. 
Concluding remarks
This paper presents a general-equilibrium analysis of the interplay of terms-of-trade and terrorism-deflecting externalities in various game-theoretic scenarios involving targeted trading countries and a common terrorist group. The associated two-stage games have the trading countries going first in choosing their counterterrorism and the terrorist group then deciding its distribution of attacks among targeted countries. In stage 2, atomistic firms react nonstrategically to these choices. In the baseline defensive counterterrorism case, there are two trading countries, developed and developing, that are targeted by the same terrorist group. The developed (developing) country imports (exports) the primary good. The trading roles are reversed for the manufactured good, which is used intensively in supplying counterterrorism. In this scenario, a terms-of-trade effect, involving the relative price fall in the primary good, induces the developed country to defend beyond the overprovision small-country level, common to the literature, where there is no terms-of-trade effect. In contrast, the developing country reduces its defensive action below that of the small-country case in order to limit the adverse 23 Under strategic substitutability, developing nations will react to greater A θ by cutting back k θ . If this strategic effect is small, global overprovision is still the likely outcome, where the terrorism-deflection externalities (discussed in Propositions 2 and 3) make for effort levels of developing nations that are still "too high" relative to the global optimum.
terms-of-trade influence as its exported primary good falls in price. This asymmetry between the defensive actions of the targeted countries highlights how trade adds a novel consideration that results in somewhat more optimistic welfare findings if the developing country's decreases to defensive measures are substantial compared to the developed country's increases to its measures. More pessimistic welfare findings occur when the developed country's terms-oftrade-induced increase to defensive measures is more substantial.
We also consider the possibility that the countries' proactive countermeasures may reduce the global resource availability for the terrorists. Such measures reduce terror in all countries and are, thus, associated with positive transnational spillovers. At a given terms-oftrade, the Nash proactive policy equilibrium tends to be characterized by underprovision of counterterrorism effort by both countries. However, the terms-of-trade externalities are qualitatively unaltered compared to the previous defensive analysis. Therefore, the developed country's terms-of-trade-driven rise in counterterrorism effort helps alleviate this country's underprovision. The opposite is true for the developing country, where underprovision is worse compared to the small-country case. In terms of welfare consequences, the asymmetry switches with the developed country ameliorating the inefficiency compared to the defensive case. Since the developed country is generally the main supplier of proactive measures, the terms-of-trade effect is likely to improve global welfare compared to cases examined in the literature.
Finally, we return to the defensive counterterrorism case to consider multiple exporters of the primary good and single developed country importer of this good. When several symmetric developing countries compete to export the primary good to the developed country, the terms-oftrade underprovision incentives for these countries dissipate in proportion to the number of exporters. As a consequence, there is a tendency in this case for greater overprovision of defensive effort and enhanced terrorism deflection across countries, thus adversely affecting global welfare.
A potential extension could allow for many developed countries that export the manufactured good to many developing countries, the source of the primary good. Another extension could permit the joint determination of defensive and proactive counterterrorism in a trade setting. Yet another extension could allow sequential moves by the targeted countries. If, for example, the developed country goes first in the proactive game, then its underprovision is anticipated to be greater than for simultaneous moves . Thus, the terms-of-trade effect may have greater welfare consequences as it reduces this underprovision.
There are many alternative scenarios for the three agents' sequence of moves. A final extension could switch the vantage so that terrorism changes world demand, rather than world supply for the security-related good, thereby affecting the expenditure function. 
The inequality in eq. (A2) 
When terrorism in the two countries have similar effects on their respective production levels of the primary good, then
Also, when counterterrorism effort of country A uses resources specific to the manufactured good, there is either no effect or a positive effect on the production of the primary good. Suppose that the manufactured good uses a capital-specific input and also labor. If counterterrorism depletes some of this sector-specific capital (and no labor), then productivity of labor falls in the manufacturing sector, and labor flows to the primary sector, which raises the output of the primary good. Consequently, we have ( ) 
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(A4) 24 We assume that both goods are normal in consumption in both countries, such that 0, 1, 2; , . 
Thus, country B will want to reduce its 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Case 1: 0
Refer to Figure 1 , where global welfare is maximized at 
Given that C lies vertically above 
Proof of Proposition 3:
Using eq. (17) and noting that the Nash equilibrium defensive vector ( )
(14b), we get:
From eq. (10a), we know that both 
The 
Eq. (C5) and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem applied to eq. (C4) imply that 0 p δ > . The intuition is the following: A rise in the terrorists' productivity raises terrorism and depletes labor resources. Through the Rybczynski effect, the decline in labor resources reduces the supply of the labor-intensive primary product. This supply reduction increases the market-clearing price of the primary product.
For tractability, we consider the welfare effect of a change in δ for the globally efficient counterterrorism equilibrium analyzed in Section 3. In this case, the envelope theorem considerably simplifies the comparative statics. Using the Heckscher-Ohlin model of the Supplementary Appendix, we can show that:
which indicates that global welfare must fall owing to a rise in the terrorists' productivity regardless of globally efficient counterterrorism response.
